上海市浦东新区南汇中心医院做丰胸手术价格
时间:2019年10月18日 00:44:45

Bello贝略The travails of ALBA玻利维亚替代计划隐隐作痛The more successful of Latin Americas populists have become more pragmatic拉美民粹者身居上游,更为脚踏实地ON THE night of October 12th, after comfortably winning a third term as the president of Bolivia, Evo Morales was in full rhetorical flow. Having dedicated his victory to Cubas Fidel Castro and the late Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, he went on: “How much longer will we continue to be subjected to the North American empire or the capitalist system? This triumph is a triumph for anti-imperialists and anti-colonialists.”10月12日晚玻利维亚总统连任三届的胜利手到擒来后,埃沃·莫拉莱斯大放厥词,他将他的光荣归功于古巴的卡斯特罗及委内瑞拉上届总统查韦斯,他称,我们受北美帝国和资本主义制度的束缚之日还有多久,我们的胜利是反帝国主义和殖民化的胜利。So far, so reminiscent of 2007. That was when Chavezs anti-yanqui continental alliance, known as the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), hit its zenith. It had gained two new recruits with the election of Rafael Correa in Ecuador and of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. Having won a new term by a 26-point margin, Chavez pledged himself to “21st-century socialism”. A year earlier Mr Morales, a socialist coca-growers leader of Amerindian descent, had won Bolivias presidency proclaiming that he was “the ed Statess worst nightmare”. In Argentina the election in 2007 of Cristina Fernandez, an ALBA fellow-traveller, prolonged the regime of her husband and predecessor, Nestor Kirchner.回想2007年,当时正值查韦斯的反美联盟美洲玻利维亚替代计划热火朝天,拉斐尔和丹尼尔在尼加拉瓜成功当选后,他们便又多了两名战友,查韦斯以领先26个百分点的成绩开启新的任期,他宣称要音量21世纪的社会主义,就在一年前,美洲印第安人莫拉莱斯以社会主义者,古柯种植领袖的身份当选玻利瓦尔的总统,称它将是美国最恐怖的噩梦,2007年在阿根廷,美洲玻利维亚计划成员克里斯蒂娜的成功当选延续了她丈夫萨洛德的政权。Analysts lumped these leaders together as radical populists, for want of a better term. Yet despite a shared bent for autocracy, there were always differences among them, not least because of their countries differing circumstances. Seven years on, their fates are distinct. In Venezuela Chavez bequeathed a toxic economic legacy to his lacklustre successor, Nicolas Maduro. A country that claims the worlds biggest oil reserves has been so badly mismanaged that it is scraping around for dollars. As for Ms Fernandez, having plunged Argentina into stagflation, she is down and almost out, despite her last-gasp effort to turn her argument over debt with a New York court into a nationalist epic.分析者将这些领导人归结为激进的民粹主义者,期望实现更好的领导,即使他们都推行专制,但之间也有所不同,其中的原因也不仅仅在于不同国家的具体国情,7年之后,他们的命运也有所不同,在委内瑞拉,查韦斯将有毒经济财富的烂摊子丢给老气横秋的继任者,这个国家声称赋予世界上最大的石油储备,国内的管理却混乱不堪,落得到处借钱的下场,克里斯蒂娜将该国推入了滞胀的深渊,虽然她竭力在纽约法庭的争论中赢得主动,尽展民族主义气节,却仍不得不下台,差点退出政坛。Their difficulties are in sharp contrast with Mr Moraless continuing popularity. True, he has been in power for a shorter period. But his success has recently owed less to “anti-capitalism” and much more to his accommodation with economic orthodoxy and local capitalists. After a turbulent early period when he pushed through a new constitution, quashed the opposition and nationalised foreign-owned oil and gas producers and utilities, he has presided over several years of political stability and economic growth. And he has made his peace with private business.这张窘境与莫拉莱斯的扶摇直上形成了鲜明的对比,不错,他当政的时间确实是短,但他的成功很大程度上是得益于他迎合经济正统学说和本地资本家的口味,受反资本主义的之风影响较小,在经过了他早先推出新宪法时的动荡之后,他横扫反对者,将外国所有的石油天然气生产设备国有化,在他的7年任期内,全国政治稳定,经济增长,他和私有企业也是关系融洽。The ALBA presidents all claim to be leading durable “revolutions”, not just any old government. In practice, all of them (save Mr Ortega) built their popularity on recycling a huge increase in rents from the commodity boom into subsidies for the poor and expanded social provision. But Mr Morales has been much less wasteful than Chavez and the Kirchners, having run a fiscal surplus every year since 2005.所有ALBA的领导人都宣称要持续推陈出新,而不是墨守成规,事实上,他们所有人都因为将由商品经济发展造成的房屋租金上涨,扭转为对穷人补助的增加和社会福利的完善而饱受欢,但与萨洛德和查韦斯相比,莫拉莱斯铺张现象更少,自从2005年全国就一直呈财政盈余的景象。Mr Correa, like Mr Morales, is becoming more pragmatic. He has invested his oil windfall in roads, schools and hospitals. He recently negotiated a trade agreement with the European Union and has restored normal ties with the IMF. Last month he watered down a new banking law under which the state was to dictate the destination of private bank loans. As for Mr Ortega, who has long been chummy with private businessmen, his espousal of a quixotic, Chinese-backed and environmentally damaging scheme for a trans-Isthmian canal looks like a search for elusive rents to sustain his familys grip on power.克里拉和莫拉莱斯一样越来越务实,他已经将石油收入投入到道路,学校和医院的建设中,最近,他和欧盟协商达成了贸易协定,也实现了与IMF之间的关系重新走上正常化,上个月,他取缔了一项新的法律,该法律规定私有的贷款将来自于国家,而对于与私人企业一直交情不浅的奥尔加来说,他最近的一项空想式的跨地峡计划似乎也旨在保障他家族大权的财力来源,这个破坏环境的计划也在私有部门和中国的持下进行的。Mr Morales and Mr Correa, who won re-election last year, may be riding high now. But there are clouds on the horizon for their “revolutions”, too. Despite the rhetoric, these do not include the ed States: Barack Obamas response to ALBA has been to yawn. Their first problem is the end of the commodity boom. Three-quarters of Bolivias exports are of natural gas or minerals, whose prices are falling. Ecuador invests much more than Bolivia. Mr Correa has boosted non-oil exports. He has done more than Mr Morales to try to diversify his countrys economy, with so far uncertain results. But his “citizens revolution” is showing signs of financial strain. Ecuador is heading for a fiscal deficit of up to 7% of GDP this year. And the oil price is crashing.莫拉莱斯和去年再次当选的克里拉现在名声大噪,但他们和明德雄心壮志上也笼罩着一些徐徐成形的阴云,即使他们大放阙词,但美国总统奥巴马对他们一直没多大兴趣,他们的第一个问题是商品经济繁荣的结束,玻利维亚出口的四分之三都是天然气和矿石,而他们的价格却在持续下降,厄瓜多尔的驼子远超玻利维亚,克里拉已经增加了非石油的进口,他为促进经济多元化的努力远胜于莫拉莱斯,但至今的结果仍不明朗,他的公民革命却呈现出经济紧缩的迹象,厄瓜多尔几年财政赤字在GDP中占到了7%,石油价格仍在下降。 译文属译生译世 /201410/337075

“Coco” bonds“可可”债券Mass conversion大规模转变Investors are panting for a risky new form of bonds issued by banks风险投资者们在寻求已发行债券之冒险新形势IT TOOK three separate bail-outs to get K, a Belgian bank, through the financial crisis. So one might expect bonds that automatically get wiped out if the bank runs into trouble again to reward investors handsomely. Not so: Ks “contingent convertible” bonds, designed to lose all their value in a crisis, yield a meagre 4% a year. Egged on by investors, banks are issuing such securities in growing amounts. Regulators are watching anxiously.为平安度过金融危机比利时央行已三次将优先股作为分红发给股东们。因此有些人可能会认为:如果再次因给予投资者丰厚回报而陷入困境的话,债券可能会因此而销声匿迹。恰恰相反:比利时央行发行的“或有可转换”债券,被认为认为将会于危机中失去其所有价值,一年收益率也达到了4%。受投资者的煽动,不断的发行此类有价债券。监管机构对此也颇为焦虑。Cocos, as these instruments are known, are a newish hybrid of bank equity and debt. Regulators globally are keen on banks having more equity. This makes bail-outs less likely and, if they prove inevitable, less painful for taxpayers. Bankers prefer debt because it lowers their tax bill, and juices both profits and bonuses. Cocos are the compromise.Cocos,不同于这些已知票据,是股本以及债务的新生儿。全球的监管机构都希望能够拥有更多的股本这会使得将优先股作为分红发放变得极不可能并且有助于缓解纳税人压力如若此举不可避免的话。则因为低税率以及利润和奖金的成本而更喜欢举债。Cocos便是折中的结果。Cocos take multiple forms, but all are intended to behave like bonds when times are good, yet absorb losses, equity-like, in a crisis. At a given trigger point, when equity levels are so low that bankruptcy threatens, cocos either lose some or all of their value, or get exchanged for shares. Regulators have allowed them to be used in limited quantities to meet increased equity requirements. Banks promise the coco bondholders will get “bailed in”, to use the regulatory argot, in lieu of taxpayers.它采取了多重形式:在光景较好的时候和债券并无两样,在经济危机承受损失之时更像是普通股。这之间有一个给定的触发点—当股本水平低到有破产的危险之时,cocos要么失去部分或全部的价值,要么用来换取股份。监管者们已经允少量的cocos被使用来满足增加的股本要求。也允诺coco的债券持有者将会代替纳税人得到“援助”—用监管者的行话来讲。Fans describe cocos as “pre-funded rights issues”, a metaphorical fire extinguisher in an otherwise tinder-like capital structure. But similar “hybrid” instruments misfired in the last crisis; none of the new generation of cocos has ever been tested. Some fret that coco bondholders could incur losses even as the issuer continues to reward shareholders, in defiance of fundamental laws of capitalism.拥护者将cocos形容为“先行投资的权利股发行”,是其他易燃资本结构的一个隐喻性的灭火器。但是类似的“混血”产物在过去的经济危机中并未奏效;同时新生代的cocos从未接受过考验。有些人苦恼coco的债券持有人将会在发行者无视资本主义规律继续回报股东之时蒙受损失。Such qualms have not stopped investors from piling in, at ever lower yields. Banks have duly stepped up issuance: from nearly nothing in 2010 to 64 billion so far this year. Credit Suisse, itself a coco-issuing bank, expects at least another 20 billion by year-end.良心上的不安没能阻止投资者们在收益率较低时涌入。已经适当的加大了发行量:从2010年的几乎为零到至今的640亿美元。瑞士信贷作为其中的发行之一,会在今年年底另增发行200亿美元。Much of this has come from big-name European lenders, such as HS, which is preparing a 6 billion issue. A mob of smaller banks is expected to follow suit later this year, after the European Central Bank vets their accounts. Peers in the Middle East and Asia are also lining up.它们中的大多数都来自于诸如丰汇之类的欧洲知名。在欧洲中央通过一些小型的审查之后,它们预计将会在今年年底效仿发行。同时中东以及亚洲的也在排队。Investors disagree whether cocos should be viewed as perilous bonds or slightly less risky shares. Amusingly and worryingly, a recent survey by Royal Bank of Scotland found that 90% of investors thought their understanding of cocos was better than average. Whizzy hedge funds used to dominate the market, but sleepier asset managers are investing in growing numbers.投资者对于将cocos视为危险债券或者低风险股票持不赞成的态度。说起来有趣但同时又令人担忧的是苏格兰皇家一项近期的研究发现:90%的投资者认为他们对于cocos的了解高于平均水平。过去是高端的对冲基金来主导市场,但现在不活跃的资产管理公司越来越多。Coco yields have fallen in part because banks balance-sheets are growing sturdier. That could change in a flash, especially if the euro zone tips back into crisis. Alex Lasagna of Algebris, a hedge fund, says each bank and bond presents its own idiosyncratic risks. The diciest of them, he says, are equivalent to “picking up pennies in front of a bullet train”.Coco投资效益下降的部分原因是由于的资产负债表变得越来越坚实。但这可能会在瞬间改变,尤其是当欧元区可能会到退回危机中。对冲基金Algebris的Alex Lasagna认为每个以及债券都呈现出了其特有的风险。它们的风险相当于“子弹头列出前捡起硬币”用他的话来说。Regulators, who crave a simpler financial system, wonder whether cocos will make dealing with failing banks even trickier. The triggering of one coco will frighten investors away from all of them. Lawsuits will undoubtedly ensue, injecting panic at the most awkward time. Given recent experience, the watchdogs are right to be wary of anything banks are keen on.监管机构的确渴望一个更为简单的金融机构所以他们想知道是否cocos会使得处理破产变得更加棘手。一个coco的失败将会作为一个触发点使得所有的投资者远离他们。毫无疑问法律诉讼会随之而来在最尴尬的时候注入恐慌。鉴于近期经验,对于监管者而言警惕任何热衷的事情是再必要不过了。 /201409/329860


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